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Abstract
Strong and vehement criticisms of statistical decision-making procedures, especially those using P -
values and a level of significance (LoS) of α = .05, have abounded in recent years and is still continuing.
For the sake of the scientific endeavor and the search for truth through data, there is tremendous impetus
to re-examine and to improve these statistical decision-making procedures. This paper re-visits the
fundamental problem of deciding the truth, based on data, between two competing hypotheses: a null
H0 and an alternative H1. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) most powerful (MP) decision function, together
with its power, remains the linchpin of statistical decision-making. Associated with this procedure is a
decision process and a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) function. It is proposed that in reporting
the outcome of the NP MP decision function, for a specified LoS, that it should always be accompanied
by the value of the (equivalently, logarithm) likelihood ratio based on the decision function. The P -
functional, which is the usual P -value statistic, associated with the decision process is re-examined. It
is pointed out that P could be used in an equivalent implementation of the NP MP decision function,
but if one wants to use its value to quantify the magnitude of support for either H0 or H1, then it
should be the value of its (equivalently, logarithm) density function under H1, which is the derivative
of the ROC function, which should be reported. This will avoid the fallacy that smaller values of P
are more supportive of H1. Replicability of results is discussed in the context of realizations of the
decision function or the P -functional. It is demonstrated that a coherent manner of acquiring knowledge
about H0 and H1 is via sequential learning through Bayesian updating. But, it is also shown that
publication bias could lead sequential updating astray in determining which of H0 or H1 is true. It is
argued that a decision-maker can choose his own LoS, instead of using the conventional LoS of α = .05,
since the summary measures accompanying the realized decision take into account the chosen LoS. Since
a decision-maker is then free to choose his LoS, the question of how to choose it optimally arises. Three
approaches for choosing the LoS are discussed, each appropriate for a specific situation a decision-maker
encounters. A new approach to sample size determination is also described. The ideas are illustrated
using concrete problems and a re-examination of Fisher’s lady tea-tasting experiment. It is hoped that
recommendations under this fundamental setting will extend to complex settings and lessen criticisms of
methods relying on P -values and an LoS of α = .05.
Key Words and Phrases: Bayes Decision Function; Hypothesis Testing; Level of Significance; Neyman-
Pearson Fundamental Lemma; Null Hypothesis Significance Testing; Replicability; P -Value; Power;
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1 The Search for Truth and Knowledge Representation
Apart from humankind’s desire to propagate its own species or, as Richard Dawkins argues in [6], their own
genes, the search for truth and the acquisition of knowledge is one of the noblest among the multitude of
human endeavors, if not its raison d’eˆtre. As John 8:32 in the Bible states: “And ye shall know the truth
and the truth shall make you free.” This passage, etched in a wall of the main lobby of the headquarters of
the United States Central Intelligence Agency, should not just be the mantra of intelligence people, but it
should be for all scientists trying to comprehend nature and the workings of the universe.
There are several types of truths. There are mathematical truths, called theorems, which are established
through a purely deductive process using logic and starting from basic axioms and rules of operations. An
example of such a mathematical truth is that
√
2 is not a rational number, a fact that is established with
certainty mathematically. But there are truths, which usually correspond to physical realities, that could
not be established through purely deductive reasoning, or even if they are derived through mathematical
arguments, still require for their confirmations an inductive statistical approach using data obtained from
observations and/or designed experiments. Professor Bradley Efron, the 2019 International Prize in Statis-
tics awardee, refers to these type of truths as “eternal and long-lasting” during his speech at the World
Statistics Congress this year in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia [7]. These could include physical truths arising
from theoretical and mathematical considerations. An example is Albert Einstein’s result concerning the
bending of light rays due to massive bodies, a consequence of his general theory of relativity, but which
still required verification based on observed data to be fully accepted by the scientific community as a truth
about reality. Incidentally, this year, 2019, is the centenary of the empirical verification of this theoretical
result of Einstein by the team headed by Sir Arthur Eddington based on observations about the bending
of light rays during a total solar eclipse; see [27]. There are also truths, which may be subject to different
interpretations, such as pertaining to whether eating red and processed meat poses health risks to people,
an issue that flared up anew with the recent publication of an article contradicting purportedly established
results showing the hazards of eating red and processed meat (see [33, 4]).
But how do we characterize or describe truths? First, truth could be in the form of a set of mathematical
formulas, a chemical structure, a biological pathway, or specified by a deterministic quantity, though the
value of the quantity may not be known. Examples of these are a follows. (a) Physical laws that are
encapsulated in mathematical formulas such as Isaac Newton’s F = ma, Einstein’s E = mc2, James Clerk
Maxwell’s equations governing electricity and magnetism, and Paul Dirac’s relativistic wave equation. (b)
The double-helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the carrier of genetic or hereditary information
in almost all living things. (c) The speed of light in a vacuum, denoted by c. (d) The state of a defendant
in a criminal murder trial which could either be guilty or innocent, but not both. (e) The proportion (θ)
of the American Electorate who will vote for Donald Trump on November 3, 2020, Presidential Election
Day. Here, truth may pertain to whether θ ≥ .50 or θ < .50. (f) The exact amount of federal taxes paid by
Trump during the period from 2005 to 2015. Second, truth could be represented via probability distributions.
Some examples falling in this category are as follows. (a) The number of deaths (N) that will be caused
by vehicular accidents in 2020 in the State of South Carolina. A possible representation of the truth about
N is that it has a Poisson probability function with mean rate λ. (b) The number of mass shootings that
will occur in the United States during 2020. Again, this could be modeled by a Poisson probability function
with mean rate λ. (c) The position and momentum of a sub-atomic particle in a chamber, which according
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to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, could only be described by their joint probability function. (d) The
temperature at noontime on January 1, 2020 at Columbia Metropolitan Airport, which could be described
by a probability distribution function, such as a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation
σ.
However, even if the truth could be represented in a deterministic manner, when data are gathered
through experiments for use in verifying or confirming the hypothesized deterministic representation, such
data will be contaminated by measurement errors or random noise, so the observables are still described by
a probability distribution which contains information about the underlying truth. For example, when Albert
A. Michelson performed his experiment in 1879 to determine the speed of light, c, his measured values were
not all identical since they were a function of c and some contaminating values.
By virtue of the inductive statistical approach in determining, establishing, or confirming a truth, total
certainty may not be achievable, in contrast to those obtained through a purely deductive approach such as
the truth about the irrationality of
√
2. To illustrate via a very simple example, consider possessing a ‘coin’
which is either ordinary (has a head and a tail) or mutated (has two heads). Suppose that we could not
directly examine it, but we could observe the outcome (face up) when it is tossed. We could keep tossing
this coin sequentially and if after n tosses we have obtained n heads, then we still could not be certain that it
is the mutated coin, however large n is. But, an observed tail in any of these n tosses implies with certainty
that we have the ordinary coin.
In this paper we revisit the problem of determining which of two simple hypotheses is true based on data.
This setting corresponds to the Neyman-Pearson framework of decision-making in its most fundamental form.
We will then discuss the notion of a P -functional, the P -value statistic, which arguably is the concept most
identified with statistical thinking, but which has gained notoriety in recent years, and has been attacked
and blamed for the ills that have befallen the scientific endeavor; see, for instance, the papers which deal with
issues and controversies about P -values [12, 30, 13, 9, 21, 1, 31, 32, 10, 18]. In the same token that a deeper
understanding of hypothesis testing was facilitated by first considering the simple null hypothesis versus
simple alternative hypothesis, leading to the Neyman-Pearson Fundamental Lemma [20], it is our viewpoint
that a better understanding of P -functionals will also be facilitated by considering this fundamental setting.
We will then examine ways in which we could improve the process of determining the truth based on data,
address how results of statistical decision-making and observed P -functionals should be reported to be more
informative and less misleading. We will also discuss the issue of replicability of scientific results, a concept in
the forefront of what is considered good science. In the process, we will discuss the idea of sequential learning
as a coherent way of getting to the truth. However, we will also demonstrate the perils of publication bias
in the sequential acquisition of knowledge. A weakness of the current practice of statistical decision-making
is the reliance on a cut-off value for the level of significance (LoS), usually set at 5%, but which is difficult
to justify logically within the mathematical theory. We will therefore examine the issue of determining an
optimal LoS which will lead to a new approach to sample size determination. The ideas and proposals
will be illustrated using concrete situations, including a re-examination of R. A. Fisher’s lady tea-tasting
experiment, which ushered null hypothesis significance testing (NHST).
2 Experiments, Observables, and Models
We will be interested in the simplest of all decision problems: determining which of two competing simple
hypotheses, denoted by H0 and H1, is true. To do this determination, an experiment or study will be
performed leading to observing the realization x of a random entity X taking values in a sample space X.
In parallel, we also perform another experiment leading to observing the realization u of a standard uniform
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random variable U taking values in U = [0, 1]. X and U are stochastically independent. Thus, the data
will be (x, u) ∈ X × U. When H0 is the truth, X is governed by a probability measure P0, whereas if H1
is the truth, then X is governed by a probability measure P1, where P0 and P1 are probability measures
on the measurable space (X, σ(X)). We denote by ν a measure on (X, σ(X)) which dominates P0 and P1
(e.g., ν = P0 + P1), and denote by f0 and f1 the probability density functions (pdfs) associated with P0
and P1 with respect to ν. Thus, we may re-state the decision problem as deciding between H0 : X ∼ f0 or
H1 : X ∼ f1 based on the data (x, u). Note that, to be more precise, under Hi, the distribution of (X,U) is
Pi⊗λ, where λ is Lebesgue measure on (U, σ(U)), hence it has density function f∗i (x, u) = fi(x)I{0 ≤ u ≤ 1}
with respect to ν ⊗ λ. The introduction of the parallel experiment leading to observing U is to provide a
randomizer in case there is a need to randomize to make the final decision. We generate this randomizer u in
conjunction with the experiment leading to x so that the use of the randomizer, if needed, does not acquire
an outsize importance in the decision-making process. Thus, u could be viewed as just being a portion of
the data (x, u). For a discussion of the use of randomizers in decision-making and to address criticisms of
their use, see section 3 of [11].
There is a dichotomy of what we would like to do regarding H0 and H1. First, given the observed data
(x, u), we may want to make a decision which of H0 or H1 is the truth, with proper consideration of the costs
associated with erroneous choices. This is the purview of decision theory and the usual hypothesis testing
approach. Second, upon seeing the data (x, u), we may simply want to update our current knowledge about
H0 and H1. A question arises how to represent our knowledge of which of H0 and H1 is the truth. We shall
do so by assigning subjective prior probabilities of κ0 and κ1 = 1−κ0, with κ0 ∈ (0, 1) representing our prior
and current belief that H0 is the truth. Given the observed data, the result of the decision function, or the
value of the P -functional, the prior probabilities will then be updated, via Bayes theorem, to the posterior
probabilities, which will then serve as, or could inform, the next set of prior probabilities of H0 and H1 to
be used in the next study. This is the essence of sequential learning and updating. The first and second
goals could be integrated by pre-specifying a threshold such that when the posterior probability of H0 [H1]
surpasses this threshold, we then declare that H0 [H1] corresponds to the truth.
3 Space of Decision Functions
Let G be the space [of equivalence classes] of all measurable functions from (X×U, σ(X)⊗σ(U)) into (<, σ(<))
which are square-integrable with respect to P0⊗λ or f0d(ν⊗λ). We endow this space with the inner product
given by, for every g1, g2 ∈ G,
〈g1, g2〉 =
∫
X×U
g1g2f0d(ν ⊗ λ) =
∫ 1
0
∫
X
g1(x, u)g2(x, u)f0(x)ν(dx)du.
The norm for G is ||g|| = √〈g, g〉. The space of decision functions for H0 versus H1 is the subset D of G
given by
D = {δ ∈ G : ∀(x, u) ∈ X× U, δ(x, u) ∈ {0, 1}}. (1)
For δ ∈ D, δ(x, u) = 1(0) means to decide in favor of H1 (H0).
The likelihood function associated with f0 and f1 will be defined via Λ(x) = f1(x)/f0(x) with the
convention that 0/0 = 0. Observe that in terms of the expectation operators, we have
E0[g(X,U)] = 〈g, 1〉 and E1[g(X,U)] = 〈g,Λ〉
with Ei(·) the expectation operator under Pi ⊗ λ for i = 0, 1.
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Given a δ ∈ D, its size and power are defined, respectively, via
αδ = 〈δ, 1〉 and piδ = 〈δ,Λ〉. (2)
For α ∈ [0, 1], a decision function δ ∈ D is said to be of level α if αδ ≤ α. A δ∗ ∈ D is a most powerful
(MP) decision function of level α if αδ∗ ≤ α and for any other δ ∈ D with αδ ≤ α, we have piδ∗ ≥ piδ. We
write such an MP decision function of level α as δ∗(α) ≡ δ∗(·, ·;α). The alternative formulation using inner
products immediately indicates that if one wants to maximize the power piδ∗(α) ≥ piδ among all {0, 1}-valued
functions δ, then the desired δ should be 1 (0) when Λ is large (small), since the maximization problem in
Lagrange form is equivalent to maximizing the mapping
(δ, η) 7→ 〈δ,Λ〉 − η(〈δ, 1〉 − α) = 〈δ, (Λ− η)〉+ ηα.
In this form we see that to maximize with respect to δ, we must take δ∗(x, u) = 1(0) whenever Λ(x) > (<)η
for some η. This is the content of the Fundamental Lemma of Neyman and Pearson (1933) stated below.
See also [16, 26].
Theorem 3.1. [Neyman-Pearson Lemma (1933) [20]] For α ∈ (0, 1), a necessary and sufficient condition
for δ∗(α) to be an MP decision function of level α for H0 : f = f0 versus H1 : f = f1 is that, for all
(x, u) ∈ X× U,
δ∗(x, u;α) =
{
1 if Λ(x) > c(α)
0 if Λ(x) < c(α)
for some c(α) ≥ 0 with αδ∗(α) = α. A particular choice of this MP decision rule is
δ∗(x, u;α) = I{Λ(x) > c(α)}+ I{Λ(x) = c(α);u ≤ γ(α)} (3)
where, with χc(x) = I{Λ(x) > c} and χc−(x) = I{Λ(x) ≥ c},
c(α) = inf{c ≥ 0 : 〈χc, 1〉 ≤ α} and γ(α) =
α− 〈χc(α), 1〉
〈χc(α)−, 1〉 − 〈χc(α), 1〉 .
Proof. For the δ∗ in the statement of the theorem, and for any other δ with 〈δ, 1〉 ≤ α, (δ∗−δ)(Λ−c(α)) ≥ 0.
Therefore, 〈δ∗ − δ,Λ − c(α)〉 ≥ 0. Expanding and re-arranging terms, we obtain that 〈δ∗,Λ〉 − 〈δ,Λ〉 ≥
c(α)(〈δ∗, 1〉 − 〈δ, 1〉), and since c(α) ≥ 0 and 〈δ∗, 1〉 = α and 〈δ, 1〉 ≤ α, then the right-hand side is at least
equal to 0. Thus, piδ∗ = 〈δ∗,Λ〉 ≥ 〈δ,Λ〉 = piδ. The particular form in (3) clearly satisfies the size condition
αδ∗ = 〈δ∗, 1〉 = α.
Most often we are able to simplify this MP decision function when we could express the likelihood function
via Λ(x) ≡ f1(x)/f0(x) = Q[S(x)] for some statistic S(·) taking values in a measurable space (S, σ(S)) and
some measurable mapping Q from (S, σ(S)) into (<+,B+), where B+ is the Borel sigma-field of subsets
of <+. The set {x ∈ X : Λ(x) > c} is equal to {x ∈ X : S(x) ∈ Q−1(c,∞)}. If Q(·) is nondecreasing in
S(·), then {x ∈ X : Λ(x) > c} = {x ∈ X : S(x) > d} for some d. Obtaining d(α) and γ(α) then becomes
simpler since they are obtained under the H0 : f = f0 distribution of S(X), which might be easier to obtain
compared to the distribution of Λ(X). The power of the level-α MP decision rule δ∗(α) in (3) is given by
ρ(α) ≡ piδ∗(α) = 〈δ∗(α),Λ〉 = 〈χc(α),Λ〉+ γ(α)〈χc(α)− − χc(α),Λ〉.
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4 NP Decision Process and ROC Function
From the MP decision function given in (3), we could form a stochastic process, which will be called an NP
decision process, given by
∆ = {δ∗(α) ≡ δ∗(·, ·;α) : α ∈ [0, 1]}. (4)
This process has right-continuous non-decreasing sample paths with state space {0, 1}. Associated with this
decision process is the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) function given by
ρ = {ρ(α) : α ∈ [0, 1]}. (5)
We present properties of the ROC function in the following proposition. Some of these results will be needed
in establishing Theorem 8.1, a result pertaining to sequential learning.
Proposition 4.1. Assume that ν{x ∈ X : f0(x) 6= f1(x)} > 0 and consider the ROC function α 7→ ρ(α)
associated with the NP decision process ∆ = {δ∗(α) : α ∈ (0, 1)}. Then
(a) ∀α ∈ (0, 1) : ρ(α) > α;
(b) α 7→ ρ(α) is non-decreasing, concave, continuous, and is piecewise differentiable with α 7→ ρ′(α) =
d
dαρ(α) non-increasing, almost everywhere (wrt Lebesgue measure);
(c) limα→0 ρ(α) = 0 and limα→1 ρ(α) = 1;
(d) ρ′(0+) ≡ limα↓0 ρ(α)α > 1 and ρ′(1−) ≡ limα↑1 1−ρ(α)1−α < 1.
Proof. Result (a) follows by taking the decision function δ(x;α) = α and using the condition that ν{f0 6=
f1} > 0. For the results in (b), given α1 < α2, the collection of decision functions of level α1 is contained in
the collection of decision functions of level α2, hence the MP decision function in the latter collection will
have power at least equal to the MP decision function in the former collection. Thus, ρ(α1) ≤ ρ(α2). Now,
let α1, α2 ∈ (0, 1) and denote by δ∗1 and δ∗2 the MP decision functions of size α1 and α2. For a ∈ (0, 1), let
α = aα1 + (1 − a)α2 and denote by δ∗ the MP decision function of size α. Consider the decision function
δ¯ = aδ∗1 + (1− a)δ∗2 . The size of δ¯ is aα1 + (1− a)α2 and its power is aρ(α1) + (1− a)ρ(α2). Since δ∗ is the
MP decision function at size α = aα1 + (1− a)α2, and δ¯ is also a decision function of size α, then the power
of δ∗ is at least that of δ¯. Therefore,
ρ(aα1 + (1− a)α2) ≥ aρ(α1) + (1− a)ρ(α2).
Since α1, α2, and a are arbitrary elements of (0, 1), then this shows that α 7→ ρ(α) is concave. Continuity
follows from this concavity. Concavity also implies that the left-hand and right-hand derivatives of ρ(α) exist,
and since it could have at most a countable number of points where left-hand and right-hand derivatives are
not equal, then it is piecewise differentiable. Second result in (c) follows immediately from 1 ≥ ρ(α) > α for
all α ∈ (0, 1). Let Λ¯ = sup{b ∈ < : P0{Λ > b} > 0}. Then c(α)→ Λ¯ as α→ 0, hence
lim
α→0
ρ(α) = lim
α→∞
{
P1{Λ > c(α)}+
[
α− P0(Λ > c(α))
P0(Λ = c(α))
]
P1(Λ = c(α))
}
= 0
since α ≥ α− P0(Λ > c(α)) ≥ 0 and
P1(Λ > c(α)) =
∫
I{Λ(x) > c(α), f0(x) > 0}Λ(x)f0(x)ν(dx)→ 0
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by virtue of α ≥ P0{Λ > c(α)} =
∫
I{f0(x) > 0,Λ(x) > c(α)}f0(x)ν(dx) → 0 so that ν{x : f0(x) >
0,Λ(x) > c(α)} → 0 and using Dominated Convergence Theorem. For the results in (d), as α ↓ 0, c(α)→ Λ¯.
If the distribution of Λ under P0 is continuous, then
ρ(α) = P1{Λ > c(α)} =
∫
I{Λ > c(α)}Λf0 ≥ c(α)
∫
I{Λ > c(α)}f0 = c(α)α,
hence ρ(α)/α ≥ c(α)→ Λ¯ as α ↓ 0. But since ν{f0 6= f1} > 0 and
∫
f0 =
∫
f1 = 1, then Λ¯ > 1; in fact, it is
possible to have Λ¯ = ∞. If P0{Λ = Λ¯} > 0, then for α < P0{Λ = Λ¯}, c(α) = Λ¯, hence P0{Λ > c(α)} = 0.
For such an α, we then have
ρ(α) = α
P1{Λ = Λ¯}
P0{Λ = Λ¯} = αΛ¯.
Therefore, ρ(α)/α = Λ¯ for all α < P0{Λ = Λ¯}, hence ρ(α)/α→ Λ¯ > 1 as α ↓ 0. Let Λ =∈ {b ∈ < : P0{Λ ≤
b} > 0}. Then, when α ↑ 1, c(α)→ Λ. If the distribution of Λ under P0 is continuous, then
1− ρ(α) = P1{Λ ≤ c(α)} =
∫
I{Λ ≤ c(α)}Λf0 ≤ c(α)P0{Λ ≤ c(α)} = c(α)(1− α)
hence [1 − ρ(α)]/[1 − α] ≤ c(α) → Λ as α ↑ 1. By same argument as for Λ¯, Λ < 1, and could take the
value 0. If P0{Λ = Λ} > 0, then for α satisfying 1 − α < P0{Λ = Λ}, we have c(α) = Λ. Therefore, for
α > 1− P0{Λ = Λ} = P0{Λ > Λ}, we have
ρ(α) = P1{Λ > Λ}+
[
α− (1− P0{Λ = Λ})
P0{Λ = Λ}
]
P1{Λ = Λ}
= P1{Λ ≥ Λ} − (1− α)
[
P1{Λ = Λ}
P0{Λ = Λ}
]
.
Thus, for α > P0{Λ > Λ}, we have
1− ρ(α) = P1{Λ < Λ}+ (1− α)P1{Λ = Λ}
P0{Λ = Λ} = (1− α)
P1{Λ = Λ}
P0{Λ = Λ}
since 0 ≤ P1{Λ < Λ} =
∫
I{Λ < Λ}Λf0 ≤ ΛP0{Λ < Λ} = 0. Therefore, as α ↑ 1, we have
1− ρ(α)
1− α →
P1{Λ = Λ}
P0{Λ = Λ} = Λ < 1.
5 P -Functionals and their Properties
For the NP decision process ∆, we define a (random) functional via
P (X,U) = inf{α : δ∗(X,U ;α) = 1}. (6)
This is the so-called P -value statistic, but we would like to stay away from this misnomer since this quantity
is truly a statistic, that is, a random variable depending only on the sample data, and it is a characteristic
of the decision process ∆. In terms of the P -functional, the size-α MP decision function is equivalent to
δ∗(x, u;α) = I{P (x, u) ≤ α}.
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The usual approach to testing H0 versus H1 is to pre-specify a level of significance (LoS) α0, which has
usually been conventionally set to 0.05, and to use a test whose size is no more than α0. As such, in order
to gain the most power, the test δ∗(·, ·;α0) is utilized. We present two important distributional properties
of the P -functional.
Theorem 5.1. Under H0, P (X,U) has a standard uniform distribution, hence its density function under
H0 is h0(w) = 1 for w ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. For w ∈ [0, 1], we have
P0{P (X,U) ≤ w} = P0{δ∗(X,U ;w) = 1} = E0[δ∗(X,U ;w)] = 〈δ∗(w), 1〉 = w.
Theorem 5.2. Under H1, P (X,U) has distribution ρ(·), hence its density function under H1 is h1(w) =
ρ′(w).
Proof. For w ∈ [0, 1], we have
P1{P (X,U) ≤ w} = P1{δ∗(X,U ;w) = 1} = E1[δ∗(X,U ;w)]
= E0[δ
∗(X,U ;w)Λ(X)] = 〈δ∗(w),Λ〉 = ρ(w).
Note therefore that if one could only observe the P -functional P (X,U), the MP decision function of H0
versus H1 of size α0 is, by the Neyman-Pearson Lemma, δ(P (x, u);α0) = I{P (x, u) ≤ α0} since w 7→ ρ′(w)
is a non-increasing function. This coincides with the MP decision function based on x. Note further that
the existence of the P -functional has nothing to do with any pre-specified LoS. The P -functional exists
whenever there is a decision process ∆. The P -functional and the pre-specified LoS only come together
when a decision about H0 and H1 is to be made. One may think of the P -functional as a decision process-
induced transformation of the original data (X,U) into a random variable (a statistic) P (X,U) that is
uniformly distributed under H0 and whose distribution under H1 is stochastically smaller than a standard
uniform distribution, since ρ(w) > w for every w ∈ (0, 1) with ρ(0) = 0 and ρ(1) = 1. As such there
is nothing mysterious about the P -functionals (albeit, P -values) – contrary to the negative attention and
notoriety it has garnered in recent years! See the recent articles on P -values [32, 14] and the other references
cited earlier.
That the P -functional is a statistic was emphasized in Kuffner and Walker [15], which also demonstrated
that the P -value statistic is in a one-to-one and onto (a bijection) relationship with the sufficient statistic in
the case when the sufficient statistic is one-dimensional. This bijection property between the P -functional
and the sufficient statistic need not hold, however, if the sufficient statistic has dimension at least 2. For
example, if H0 : µ = µ0, σ
2 > 0 and H1 : µ 6= µ0, σ2 > 0 and the data set to test H0 versus H1 is
X1, X2, . . . , Xn ∼ N(µ, σ2), the sufficient statistic is T = (
∑
Xi,
∑
X2i ), which is two-dimensional and which
could not be recovered if given only the P -value statistic based on the t-test statistic T = (X¯−µ0)/(S/
√
n) of
H0 and H1. Note that in this case, the t-test statistic is not sufficient for (µ, σ
2). We note, though, that the
bijection property between the P -functional and the sufficient statistic may still hold in higher-dimensions
if we instead consider the invariantly sufficient test statistic. For example, the t-test statistic is invariantly
sufficient under the location-scale group of transformations.
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6 Issue of Replicability
In the recent United States National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine report on repro-
ducibility and replicability in science [19], a distinction is made between the notions of reproducibility and
replicability. According to this report, reproducibility means being able to obtain consistent computational
results using the same input data, computational steps, methods, code, and conditions of analysis; whereas,
replicability means being able to obtain consistent results across studies aimed at answering the same sci-
entific question, each of which has obtained its own data. The notion of replicability is arguably the more
important one in the context of the integrity and viability of scientific results. Let us examine the notion of
replicability in the context of using the MP decision function and the P -functional in deciding between H0
and H1.
Consider a scientist performing a study to decide between H0 and H1. Following existing decision-making
procedures, he specifies an LoS to use, and assume he chooses the traditional value of α1 = 0.05. Let (x1, u1)
be his observed data, and let
d1 = δ(x1, u1;α1) and p1 = P (x1, u1)
be the observed decision and the observed P -functional, respectively. Suppose it turns out that d1 = 1. Then
the scientist will conclude that H1 is true, instead of H0, at LoS α1 = .05. What does this really mean? If H0
is in reality true, using the decision function δ(·, ·;α1), there is a 0.05 chance that H0 will be declared false;
so the observed d1 = 1 is one of these false discovery realizations. On the other hand, if H1 is in reality true,
there is a probability of ρ(α1) of concluding that this is indeed the case, and the realized decision d1 = 1
is one of these correct decisions. But this observed decision of d1 = 1 does not preclude either of the two
possibilities of H0 or H1. If a second scientist performs a study with LoS of α2 = .05 to decide between H0
and H1, this scientist may get a decision d2 = 0, which will be contradicting the first scientist’s decision,
and we might then say that the first scientist’s result is not replicable. But if H0 is the true hypothesis, then
the result of the second scientist was highly likely (probability of 0.95 prior to performing the study); while
if H1 is true, this false negative result by the second scientist was also plausible if the power ρ(α2) is not
high, with this power determined by the ‘effect size’ or the ‘distance’ between f0 and f1. As such the issue
of replicability is a difficult question to resolve when considering the results of two scientists.
Let us examine this further when there are many replications. Suppose that there are M = 100 scientists,
labeled m = 1, 2, . . . ,M, who will perform their own independent studies, each using an LoS of αm = .05, to
decide between H0 and H1, with the mth scientist using the MP decision function δ
∗
m(αm) = δ
∗
m(xm, um;αm)
whose power is ρm(αm). If H0 is true, about 5 of these scientists will obtain values of dm = 1 for their
δ∗m(xm, um;α0); while, if H1 is true, depending on their ρm(αm)s, there will tend to be more than 5 of them
with dm = 1. Under both cases, the occurrences of dm = 1 will appear in a random order for these M
scientists. With many independent replications, we will better see which of H0 or H1 is more plausible.
But, any other scientist, or even the same scientist, performing another study to decide between H0 and H1
may come up with a decision which disagrees with the totality of results of the M scientists. As such, when
focusing on the results of individual scientists the replicability issue will always arise under both H0 or H1.
The same thing happens with the P -functional. Under H0, P (X,U) has a uniform distribution over [0, 1],
so that any value between [0, 1] is not surprising under H0. Under H1, the distribution of P (X,U) will be
right-skewed, so smaller values will be more likely. But, with one realization of P (X,U) that is smaller than
α = 0.05, it again does not preclude either H0 or H1. With 100 scientists performing independent studies
and observing their P -functionals, if H0 is true, then their observed P ’s will tend to be uniform over [0, 1];
while if H1 is true, then their observed P ’s will tend to have a histogram that is right-skewed. We also
reiterate that if the observed P (x, u) = p is less than α =0.05, it is faulty to state that H0 is rejected at LoS
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of p. But, it is fine to conclude that H0 is rejected at LoS of α = 0.05, provided that this LoS value was
chosen prior to observing the data (x, u). The point is that the observed data should not determine the LoS
that is used to make the decision.
Appropriately, the NAS Report [19] points out the difficulty in assessing the notion of replicable results.
It states as follows:
Because of the complicated relationship between replicability and its variety of sources, the
validity of scientific results should be considered in the context of an entire body of evidence,
rather than an individual study or an individual replication. Moreover, replication may be a
matter of degree, rather than a binary result of “success” or “failure.”
To concretely demonstrate these issues concerning replicability, consider the two-sample problem of test-
ing hypotheses about the difference of two population means, with the pair of hypotheses
H0 : µ1 − µ0 = 0 versus H1 : µ1 − µ0 = κ
where κ > 0. For the mth scientist, with m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,M = 100}, we suppose that his sample data are
realizations of
Xm = (Xm1, Xm2, . . . , Xmnm) ∼ N(µ0, σ2);
Ym = (Ym1, Ym2, . . . , Ymnm) ∼ N(µ1, σ2),
with Xm independent of Ym. Here σ
2 > 0 is assumed unknown. Let the sample sizes be determined according
to nm ∼ POI(λ) + 5. The possibly differing sample sizes among these M scientists is meant to model the
realistic situation where they have different experimental resources available to each of them, so some will
have larger sample sizes, hence will have higher powers for their decision functions. It is without doubt
that there will be investigators which will have more resources, possibly due to more research funding, while
others will have meager resources but would still want to contribute to the resolution of a scientific question
even with their limited resources. For the mth scientist the summary statistics from the two samples will
be the sample means X¯m and Y¯m and the sample variances S
2
mX and S
2
mY . The α-size test procedure to be
used by the mth scientist is δ∗m(Xm, Ym;α) = I{Tmc ≥ t2(nm−1);α} where
Tmc =
Y¯m − X¯m
Sm
√
2/nm
; S2m =
S2mX + S
2
mY
2
; t2(nm−1);α = T −1(1− α; 2(nm − 1)),
where T (·; k) is Student’s central t-distribution with k degrees-of-freedom. The P -functionals, which do not
require randomizers because of continuity, are given by
Pm(Xm, Ym) = inf{α ∈ (0, 1) : δm(Xm, Ym;α) = 1} = 1− T (Tmc; 2(nm − 1)).
The ROC function of ∆m = {δ∗m(Xm, Ym;α) : α ∈ [0, 1]}, is given by, for α ∈ [0, 1],
ρm(α;κ, σ, nm) = 1− T
(
t2(nm−1);α; 2(nm − 1),
κ
σ
√
2/nm
)
, (7)
where T (·; k, ω) is a k degrees-of-freedom non-central t-distribution with non-centrality parameter ω. The
derivative of this ROC function, which is the density function of Pm(Xm, Ym) under H1, is given by
ρ′m(α;κ, σ, nm) =
T ′
(
T −1(1− α; 2(nm − 1)); 2(nm − 1), κ
σ
√
2/nm
)
T ′ (T −1(1− α; 2(nm − 1)); 2(nm − 1)) , (8)
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Figure 1: The ROC function and PDFs under H0 and H1 of Pm(Xm, Ym) for the two-sample testing problem
with nm = 5, µ0 = 0, µ1 = 5, σ = 5, and α = .05.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
alpha
RO
C F
unc
tion
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0
2
4
6
8
10
alpha
PD
F u
nde
r H1
 of 
P-V
alue
where T ′(·; ·, ·) is the associated density function for Student’s t-distribution. These functions are easily
evaluated using the R [24] objects pt, dt, and qt. Figure 1 plots the ROC curve and the pdfs of Pm(Xm, Ym)
under H0 and H1 for the case with nm = 5, κ = 5, σ = 5, and α = .05. Observe that the ROC curve is
above the 45-degree line, while the PDF of P (X,Y ) under H1 is right-skewed. The behaviors of the ROC
function ρ(·) and ρ′(·) agree with those stated in Proposition 4.1, though it should be pointed out that
this two-sample t-test is not the uniformly most powerful test (UMP) of H0 versus H1, but it is the UMP
unbiased decision function [16, 26].
The plots in Figure 2 represent the simulated results for the 100 scientists under H0, while those in Figure
3 are those under H1. An LoS of α0 = 0.05, together with µ0 = 0, µ1 = 2, so κ = 2, and σ = 5, were utilized
by each of these 100 scientists, though they could have also used varied LoSs. In each of these plot panels,
the first represents the sequence of sample sizes nms; the second is the sequence of decisions dms, together
with the sequence of pms; the third is the histogram of the pms; and the fourth is the sequence of updated
probabilities of H0, which will be discussed in Section 8. Looking at these plots, in particular the second
panel in each figure, assessing replicability of results, especially with just a few results, would be a difficult
matter. Under H0, decisions that coincide with not rejecting H0 (dm = 0) would be assessed as replicable,
but only if viewed under many replications; but, under H1, the correct decisions of rejecting H0 (dm = 1)
may still be considered as not replicable since there are many more replications where H0 is not rejected
owing to the moderate powers of the decision functions used.
One could argue that since we are examining the results of 100 scientists, that we ought to have adjusted
for the multiple testing. However, we wanted to mimic the realistic situation where each scientist performs
their own study with or without knowledge of other scientists studies, hence chooses their own LoS, which
will usually be 0.05 in the existing statistical decision-making paradigm.
7 Knowledge Updating and Reporting Results
So, how do we address the question of assessing the replicability of results? As the NAS report [19] alludes
to, this should be done ‘in the context of an entire body of evidence, rather than an individual study or an
individual replication’. In a sense, each scientist’s result should be utilized to update the current knowledge
that we possess about H0 and H1. As mentioned in Section 1, our knowledge of H0 (H1) could be represented
11
Figure 2: Sequences of the values of the decision function δ∗m(α) and values of the Pm-functional, under H0,
for the two-sample problem for 100 scientists. First panel is the sample size used for each sample, the second
panel contains the decisions dms and the pms, the third panel is the histogram of the pms, and the fourth
panel is the sequence of updated probabilities of H0 based on updating on the dms and pms.
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Figure 3: Sequences of the values of the decision function δ∗m(α) and values of the Pm-functional, under H1,
for the two-sample problem for 100 scientists. First panel is the sample size used for each sample, the second
panel contains the decisions dms and the pms, the third panel is the histogram of the pms, and the fourth
panel is the sequence of updated probabilities of H0 based on updating on the dms and pms.
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by our subjective probability that H0 (H1) is true. As such upon seeing an individual scientist’s result, be it
the data x, the decision d, or the observed p, it should be used to update the current probability that H0 is
true. The updated probability that H0 (H1) is true will then represent the new knowledge about H0 (H1).
Denote by κ0 the prior probability that H0 is true, and by κ1 = 1− κ0 the prior probability that H1 is
true. If the observed data x is reported, then by Bayes Theorem we obtain the posterior probabilities of H0
and H1 via:
κ0(x) =
κ0f0(x)
κ0f0(x) + κ1f1(x)
=
1
1 + (κ1/κ0)Λ(x)
; (9)
κ1(x) = 1− κ0(x).
On the other hand, if only α0 and d = δ
∗(x, u;α0) are reported, then the posterior probabilities are
computed via Bayes theorem according to
κ0(d, α0) =
κ0α
d
0(1− α0)1−d
κ0αd0(1− α0)1−d + κ1ρ(α0)d[1− ρ(α0)]1−d
(10)
=
1
1 + (κ1/κ0)ΛD(d;α0, ρ(α0))
;
κ1(d, α0) = 1− κ0(d, α0),
where
ΛD(d;α0) =
[
ρ(α0)
α0
]d [
1− ρ(α0)
1− α0
]1−d
(11)
is the likelihood ratio based on observing δ∗(X,U ;α0). Observe that this updating will depend on the
LoS used and the associated power or ROC value at the LoS of the decision rule. This updating rule also
demonstrates the quantitative type of information obtained from a decision as a function of the LoS and
power. For suppose that the decision is d = 1, i.e., reject H0. Observe that as α0 → 0, κ0(1, α0) →
κ0/(κ0 + κ1ρ
′(0+)), and since ρ′(0+) > 1 by Proposition 4.1, then this limiting posterior probability is less
than κ0. That is, a “reject H0” result with a small LoS provides evidence that H0 is not true. In the
other extreme, when d = 1 and α0 → 1, κ0(1, α0) → κ0, indicating that a “reject H0” result, but with
a large LoS, is not informative about whether H0 is true or false. More could be said with respect to the
interplay between the LoS α0 and the power ρ(α0) and the information contained in the decision d. From the
expression of ΛD in (11), observe that if d = 1 and ρ(α0)/α0 is much larger than 1, then this will contribute
to a big change in the updated posterior probability that H0 is true (will decrease this probability); whereas,
if 1 < ρ(α0)/α0 ≈ 1, then d = 1 will not alter much this probability. When α0 is small, then ρ(α0)/α0 will
tend to be large, while when α0 is large, then ρ(α0)/α0 will tend to be close to 1.
The opposite holds true when the decision is d = 0, that is, “do not reject H0”. If α0 → 0, then
κ0(0, α0) → κ0; while when α0 → 1, then κ0(0, α0) → κ0/[κ0 + κ1ρ′(1−)], and since ρ′(1−) < 1 by
Proposition 4.1, this limit value exceeds κ0. That is, a “do not reject H0” decision with small α0 is not
informative about H0; whereas, it is informative about H0 when α0 is large. Again, more could be said from
ΛD since when d = 0 the relevant factor is [1 − ρ(α0)]/[1 − α0]. When α0 is small, then this ratio is close
to 1, so that it will not alter much the prior probability of H0 in the updating; whereas, if α0 is large and
power ρ(α0) at α0 is large, then the ratio becomes small, thus contributing to a big change from prior to
posterior probabilities.
These considerations indicate that it is imperative to accompany the decision d, if a decision is actually
needed to be made, with the value of ΛD(d;α0) or, equivalently, by log ΛD(d;α0), a deviance associated
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with δ∗(α0), which measures the quality of the information about H0 and H1 provided by the realization
of the decision function. This shows that specific thresholds on the LoS, such as the 0.05 threshold, are
really not needed since whatever LoS α0 value a scientist uses, provided it is not data-determined, will be
automatically factored into the summary measure ΛD(d;α0) or log ΛD(d;α0). Note that the power ρ(α0) of
the decision function at the chosen α0 is a critical component in this summary measure. In a similar vein
that an estimate of the standard error of an estimator accompanies the estimate arising from the estimator
to serve as a measure of the precision of the estimate, then log ΛD(d;α0) could be viewed as a measure of
the quality of the realized decision, with a large value of | log ΛD(d;α0)| indicating the decision d is of high
quality.
If one wants to use the value p of the P -functional to update the current knowledge of H0 and H1, then
their posterior probabilities are computed via Bayes theorem using
κ0(p) =
κ0
κ0 + κ1ρ′(p)
=
1
1 + (κ1/κ0)ρ′(p)
; (12)
κ1(p) = 1− κ0(p). (13)
Let us examine the information provided by different values of p. Recall that ρ′(α) is decreasing in α under
H1 with ρ
′(0+) > 1 and ρ′(1−) < 0 by Proposition 4.1, so that there exists an α∗ such that ρ′(α∗) = 1.
Thus, for p1 < p2 < α
∗, we will have that κ0(p1) < κ0(p2) < κ0, indicating that smaller observed P -values
are more indicative that the H0 is not true. When α
∗ < p1 < p2, then κ0 < κ0(p1) < κ0(p2), so in this case,
larger values of the P -functional are more indicative that H0 is true. These results mathematically depict
the information contained in the P -functional about H0 and H1, and coincides with our intuition that small
p-values point more towards H1 being true, whereas large p-values are indicative of H0 being true. However,
note that this conclusion will depend on the α∗ satisfying ρ′(α∗) = 1, and such an α∗ will be dependent on
the ROC function of the decision process, which in turn will depend on the effect size associated with the
H0 and H1 and usually on the sample size used in the study.
Based on these considerations, just reporting the value p of the P -functional, which is the modus operandi
when used in Fisher’s NHST approach and in many statistical hypothesis-testing procedures, apparently is
not a good approach and could in fact mislead, since users could make conclusions about the strength of
evidence for or against H0 simply based on the magnitude of p, e.g., when p = 0.0001 that H0 is highly
implausible. This fallacy is demonstrated by considering two simple alternative hypotheses, which are in
the same direction. For the same observed data (x, u), the P -functional value will not change under both
alternative hypotheses since it is computed only under H0. But, clearly, the information content about H0
in the realized P -functional differs under the two alternative hypotheses. More ominously, one would then
think that a small p will indicate more support for the more extreme alternative hypothesis, but this turns
out to be not the case in general. Thus, there is something missing when we only report the realized value
p, as is done in NHST and in many statistical hypothesis testing situations.
So, what might be a better approach? We propose to report as summary measure ρ′(p) or log ρ′(p), with
a small [large] value indicating more [less] support towards H0. We point out that this is different from
Greenland’s [10] proposal of reporting the S-value, the negative of the logarithm of the p-value itself, which
will still not reflect anything about the alternative hypothesis. An advocate of the NHST approach might
argue that this cannot be implemented since there is no alternative hypothesis under the NHST approach
since it only asks if the data is consistent with the null model. But, without an alternative model the question
of when an observation is inconsistent with the null model becomes problematic. For instance, suppose that
the null model is that X has a standard uniform distribution. One might conclude that an outcome x in
[0, .05] is an extreme realization under the model, but what about an outcome in x in [.475, .525]? Both
15
events have the same probability of .05 under the null model! The Neyman-Pearson framework, which could
be viewed as an alteration of the NHST framework, improves on the NHST approach since it insists on taking
into account an alternative model, thereby eliminating the indeterminacy of what will be considered as more
extreme data realizations under the null model in light of the alternative model. In addition, we point
out that it is possible, for example, to have p = .0001 – which would ordinarily be interpreted as strongly
supporting H1 – but at the same time to have ρ
′(.0001) << 1, which is indicative of more support for H0.
The summary measure ρ′(p), or equivalently log ρ′(p), is the P -based likelihood ratio, so it accounts for the
distributions of P under both H0 and H1; whereas, the current practice of reporting p in isolation, provides a
rudderless summary measure since it does not have the proper context to assess its informativeness towards
H0 or H1. Any value of p with ρ
′(p) = 1, or, equivalently log ρ′(p) = 0, is totally uninformative about H0
and H1, and such a p could possibly be close to zero, close to one, or somewhere in the middle portion of
[0, 1]. Now, if one wants to make a decision between H0 and H1 using the value p, then he must specify an
LoS α0, determined independently of the observed data, and decide d = 0[1] if p > [≤]α0, but he must then
accompany this with ΛD(d;α0) or log ΛD(d;α0) as indicated earlier regarding the reporting of the result of
a decision function. It is also worth noting that the value of ρ′(p) plays a major role in the optimal choice
of LoSs to use in a generalized Benjamini-Hochberg [2] false discovery rate (FDR) controlling procedure to
optimize the global power (see Theorem 4.3 in [22]) in a multiple testing setting, thus lending credence that
the value of ρ′(p) is the more important quantity instead of just the value of p itself. We note in passing
that many multiple-testing procedures, including the BH procedure [2], that corrects for multiplicity are just
based on the values of the P -functional for each of the multiple tests, thereby creating a possible opening
for improving such procedures by considering instead the values of ρ′(p) for each of the multiple tests; see
also [23].
In order to implement the updating rules based on observing δ(x, u;α0) = d and P (x, u) = p, the
quantities ρ(α0) and ρ
′(p) need to be known. In principle, knowledge of f0 and f1, which are needed for the
updating based on observing X = x, is sufficient to determine ρ(α) and hence ρ′(α). Since our main focus
in this paper is the simple H0 versus the simple H1 setting, these functions will be completely known.
However, let us briefly consider a situation with a composite H1. Thus, suppose that X has pdf f
with respect to a dominating measure ν and which belongs to a family of pdfs F = {f(x; θ) : θ ∈ Θ ⊂ <}
satisfying a monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) property in the one-dimensional statistic S(x) (see, for instance,
[16] for discussions of the MLR property), and of interest is to decide between the simple null hypothesis
H0 : θ = θ0 and the composite alternative hypothesis H1 : θ > θ0. There will be a decision process
∆ = {δ(x, u;α) : α ∈ (0, 1)} for H0 versus H1 of form
δ(x, u;α) = I{S(x) > c(α)}+ I{S(x) = c(α);u ≤ γ(α)},
where c(α) and γ(α) only depends on the distribution of S(X) under H0. For this decision process there
will be an associated ROC function which will depend on both α and θ1, where θ1 is the true value of θ:
ρ(θ0, θ1) = {ρ(α; θ0, θ1) : α ∈ (0, 1)}, with
ρ(α; θ0, θ1) = 〈δ(α),Λ(θ0, θ1)〉
where
Λ(θ0, θ1) = Λ(x; θ0, θ1) = f(x; θ1)/f(x; θ0) = g[S(x); θ0, θ1]
for some g(s; θ0, θ1) which is non-decreasing in s whenever θ1 > θ0, and with the inner product defined via
〈g1, g2〉 =
∫ 1
0
∫
X
g1(x, u)g2(x, u)f(x; θ0)ν(dx)du.
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Given the realized decision d based on decision function δ(·, ·;α) and realized p of the P -functional, we let
lD(θ1; θ0, d, α) = d log
[
ρ(α; θ0, θ1)
α
]
+ (1− d) log
[
1− ρ(α; θ0, θ1)
1− α
]
;
lP (θ1; θ0, p) = log ρ
′(p; θ0, θ1),
denote the log-likelihood ratios based on D = d and P = p, respectively. The dependence of each of these
functions on (θ0, θ1) will usually be through a one-dimensional parametric function ξ(θ0, θ1), which represents
the ‘effect size’ or the ‘distance’ between θ0 and θ1. As summary plots to accompany the decision d or the
realized P -functional p, we could provide plots of (ξ(θ0, θ1), lD(θ1, ; θ0, α, d)) or (ξ(θ0, θ1), lP (θ1; θ0, p)) as θ1
varies from θ0. Such plots could provide information about the quality of the information about H0 : θ = θ0
versus the possible values under H1. Values of these functions that are close to zero will not be informative,
whereas large values will indicate support of H1, while small values will indicate support for H0.
We illustrate the above ideas using the two-sample setting utilized in the simulation study in Section
6. For a given µ0, µ1, and σ, the standardized effect size is defined as ξ = (µ1 − µ0)/σ. Given an n and
α, together with the value of ξ, we obtain an expression for lD(ξ; d, α) and also lP (ξ; p). We could plot in
3-dimensional space the mappings (ξ, α) 7→ lD(ξ; d, α) and (ξ, p) 7→ lP (ξ; p), or we could also just create
contour plots of these mappings. For aesthetic purposes, it is better to plot with respect to (ξ, log(α/(1−α))
the lD(ξ; d, α) and (ξ, log(p/(1−p)) the lP (ξ; p). Figure 4 provides these contour plots for n = 10 and n = 20.
The contour plots associated with lD(ξ, α; d) provide information regarding the quality of information about
H0 and H1 that could be obtained from observing either a decision of d = 0 (do not reject H0) or d = 1
(reject H0) for pairs of values of (ξ, log(α/(1−α)); whereas, the contour plot associated with lP (ξ, p) provides
information about the quality of information regarding H0 and H1 that one obtains for (ξ, log(p/(1 − p)).
Just for reference, note that log(.05/(1− .05)) = −2.9444.
Next, to illustrate what could transpire in practice, we generated two data sets each under the null
hypothesis model (H0 : µ0 = 0, µ1 = 0) and under the specific alternative hypothesis model (H1 : µ0 =
0, µ1 = 5) with σ = 5 with n = 10 and n = 20. Based on the generated two-sample data sets, we determined
the realized decision, d, under an LoS of α = .05, and the value of p. We provide the comparative boxplots
of the two samples, together with the plot of ξ 7→ lD(ξ; d, α) and ξ 7→ lP (ξ; p) for different values of ξ. The
realized d and p are indicated at the top of the second and third plot panels in Figures 5 and 6.
In Figure 5, both sample realizations with n = 10, which were generated under the null model, led to d = 0
at α = .05 and the realized P were .6153 and .4048. Looking at the plots of ξ 7→ lD(ξ; d, α) and ξ 7→ lP (ξ; p),
these all point to support for H0, with the strength of support increasing as ξ increases. Also in Figure 5
where the y-sample was generated from a normal with mean 5 still with n = 10, so under H1, the two sample
realizations still yielded d = 0 at α = .05, which are both Type II errors. The plots of ξ 7→ lD(ξ; d = 0, α)
were below zero, indicating support for H0. Note by the way that the dependence on the observed data of
lD(ξ; d, α) is only through the value of d, so since d = 0 for the four sample realizations in Figures 5, the
plots of ξ 7→ lD(ξ; d, α) were all identical. The realized P were .1513 and .1792, with corresponding plots of
ξ 7→ lP (ξ; p) being above zero for a small range of values of ξ, lending very mild support for H1, but this
support for H1 disappears and reverses to support for H0 when ξ is increased. The intuition here is that
when ξ is large, it is expected that the values of P should be much smaller than the values observed, but
since they were not, then H0 became more plausible than H1 for the observed p. As such the information
contained in the realization of P is dependent on the alternative value under consideration and the direction
of support it provides, whether towards H0 or H1, could even change with the same data. Figure 6, with
data generated under the null model with n = 20, led to d = 0 for both sample realizations, though for
the second realization, p = .07, which converted to a mild support for H1 when the effect size is small, and
17
Figure 4: Contour plots of lD(ξ; d, α) and lP (ξ; p) with respect to the effect size ξ and log(α/(1 − α)) or
log(p/(1− p)) for n = 10 (first column) and n = 20 (second column) in the two-sample problem.
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Figure 5: Sample realizations (two each) from the two-sample model under H0 and H1 together with the
plots of the log-likelihood ratio summaries as a function of effect size with sample size of n = 10.
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Figure 6: Sample realizations (two each) from the two-sample model under H0 and H1 together with the
plots of the log-likelihood ratio summaries as a function of effect size with sample size of n = 20.
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support for H0 when the effect size is large. In Figure 6, with data generated under the specific alternative
model with n = 20, both sample realizations led to d = 1, which are correct decisions; while the realized P
were about ≈ 0 and .04. When p ≈ 0, note that the plot of p 7→ lP (ξ; p) is increasing over the range plotted,
while when p = .04, it increases first, then starts to decrease and goes below zero, lending support for H0.
In these plots, we observe that the plot of p 7→ lP (ξ; p) either decreases immediately, or it increases first then
decreases. This is a manifestation of the mathematical result pointed out earlier that, even when p is quite
small, it could still lead to supporting H0 if the effect size under consideration is quite large. This appears
to be a fatal flaw of P when its exact value is used to infer about the strength of support for either H0 or
H1. This defect, however, is circumvented if one utilizes the value of ρ
′(p) or log(ρ′(p)) = lP (p) to deduce
the strength of support for H0 or H1, or if the value p is used in the MP decision function where an LoS
α is specified and H0 is rejected whenever p ≤ α. In the latter case, whatever decision is made should be
accompanied by a plot or table of values of (ξ, lD(ξ; d, α)).
Next, we present an application to the famous R. A. Fisher’s lady tea-tasting experiment, which ushered
the era of NHST [8, 17]. We discuss two versions of this tea-tasting experiment.
Version 1: There are eight cups on which tea has been mixed with milk. On each of these cups, the
order in which the milk and the tea were placed is unknown to a lady – a lady who claims that she is able to
determine, with higher probability than just guessing, the order in which tea and milk were placed. Denote
by θ the probability that the lady is able to correctly determine the order in which the tea and the milk were
placed. The hypothesis testing problem is to test H0 : θ = .5 versus H1 : θ > .5, though from the NHST
framework there is just the null hypothesis H0 but no H1. Let S denote the number of correct identifications
by the lady. Then, under an independence assumption, S has a binomial distribution with parameters n = 8
and θ, that is, the probability mass function of S is
pS(s|θ) = P{S = s|θ} =
(
8
s
)
θs(1− θ)8−s, s = 0, 1, . . . , 8.
The UMP size-α (randomized) decision function is
δ∗(s, u;α) = I{S > c(α)}+ I{S = c(α), u ≤ γ(α)}
with
c(α) = inf{c : P{S > c|θ = .5} ≤ α} and γ(α) = α− P{S > c(α)|θ = .5}
P{S = c(α)|θ = .5} .
For the decision process ∆ = {δ∗(·, ·;α) : α ∈ (0, 1)} the associated ROC function at θ = θ1 is
ρ(α; θ1) = P{S > c(α)|θ1}+ γ(c(α))P{S = c(α)|θ1}
with derivative given by
ρ′(α; θ1) =
P{S = c(α)|θ = θ1}
P{S = c(α)|θ = .5} .
This is the density function, which is piecewise constant, of the P -functional under θ = θ1, with the P -
functional being
P ≡ P (S,U) = P{S∗ > S}+ UP{S∗ = S}
with S∗ having a binomial distribution with parameters n = 8 and θ = .5 and is independent of (S,U).
Figure 7 provides the plots of lD(θ1; s) and lP (θ1; s) for different values of θ1 > .5 and for an LoS of
α = .05. The overlaid plots are for different possible realizations of S, which are s ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , 8}. In
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Figure 7: Plots of lD(θ1; s) and lP (θ1; s) with respect to θ1 for different possible realizations of S, the number
of correct identifications out of n = 8 trials, in the tea-tasting experiment under the binomial model. For
lD, an LoS of α = .05 was used. For the lD plot, the upper curve is for s ≥ 7 with d = 1 (H0 : θ = .5 was
rejected), while the lower curve is for s ≤ 6 with d = 0 (H0 not rejected).
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particular, focus on the case s = 6 which corresponds to the situation where the lady correctly identifies the
order of placement of milk and tea in 6 of the 8 cups. The observed randomization value was u = .973 and
the realized P was p = .1416. The observed decision in this case is d = 0, so the lD-plot is below zero, though
still close to zero even for θ1 about .7, but it then decreases rapidly as θ1 becomes larger. The associated
lP -plot is the third curve from the top, which is slightly above zero, but dips below zero when θ1 exceeds .9.
Observe that even if s = 8, corresponding to the lady correctly identifying the orderings in all 8 cups, the
strength of the support for H1 is still not strong.
Version 2: This is the version described in [8] (see also [17]). The lady is told that out of the 8 cups,
4 of them had the tea placed first before the milk, and in the other 4 it is in the reverse order. The lady is
then asked to choose the 4 cups in which the tea was placed before the milk. Let T be the number out of the
four cups chosen by the lady in which tea preceded milk. Fisher introduced the notion of the null hypothesis
which in this case coincides with the hypothesis that the lady does not have discriminatory abilities, hence
the distribution of T under this hypothesis is hypergeometric with parameters 4, 4, and 4, that is,
pT (t) = P{T = t|H0} =
(
4
t
)(
4
4−t
)(
8
4
) , t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. (14)
H0 is then rejected when T is large, though even this rejection criterion tacitly considers the alternative
model that the lady has discriminatory powers. But one could formulate this problem more formally to
accord with the Neyman-Pearson framework. When θ is the probability that the lady could determine which
came first (tea or milk), then the probability mass function of T is given by
pT (t; θ) = P{T = t|θ} =
(
4
t
)2
θt(1− θ)8−t∑4
j=0
(
4
j
)2
θj(1− θ)8−j
, t = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4. (15)
Observe that when θ = .5, pT (t; .5) is the hypergeometric distribution given in (14). As in the binomial
model, the UMP decision function of size α is of the same form with T replacing S and with pT (t; θ) replacing
pS(s; θ).
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Figure 8: Plots of lD(θ1; s) and lP (θ1; s) with respect to θ1 for different possible realizations of T , the number
of correct identifications out of the four cups chosen by the lady in the tea-tasting experiment as described in
[8]. For lD, an LoS of α = .05 was used. For the lD plot, the upper curve is for t = 4 with d = 1 (H0 : θ = .5
was rejected), while the lower curve is for t ≤ 3 with d = 0 (H0 not rejected). In Fisher’s experiment, the
observed value of T was t = 3.
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The profiles obtained for this version of the experiment are similar to the binomial version as shown in
Figure 8. For the observed value of t = 3 and with randomization value of u = .815, the decision is not to
reject H0 at LoS of α = .05 and the realized P is p = 0.2007. This result could be considered as inconclusive
since we note that the associated lD(θ1) is close to zero. The same conclusion arises by looking at the second
curve from the top in the lP (θ1) plot which is also close to zero. If the lady had instead obtained t = 4,
which would have coincided with the correct identifications for all 8 cups, then there would have been a
stronger support for H1 based on these profile plots.
8 Sequential Learning
The Bayes updating formulas in (9), (10), and (12) when given x, d, or p, respectively, can be used to
sequentially update the knowledge about H0 and H1 as results of other studies are sequentially obtained.
The current posterior probabilities will become the prior probabilities at the beginning of the next study,
and the result of this new study, whether x, d, or p, will be used to update these prior probabilities. The
beauty of this approach is that whatever study is performed, so long as it is performed with integrity and
honesty, whether it is a study with large or small sample sizes, will be able to contribute to the updating of
the knowledge about H0 and H1. Theorem 8.1 states that if H0 [H1] is true, and provided that the initial
prior probabilities of H0 and H1 are not 0 nor 1, then the sequence of posterior probabilities for H0 [H1]
will converge almost surely to 1. As such, one could specify a threshold  > 0, say  = .0001 or determined
in considerations of the cost consequences of decisions, such that when either posterior probability exceeds
1− , a final conclusion on the truth or falsity of H0 and H1 is made. This sequential approach to learning
about the truth of H0 and H1 is depicted in the pseudo-code below.
Pseudo-Code for Sequential Updating of Knowledge of H0 and H1
START;
Specify Threshold,  = 0.0001 (say);
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Specify Prior Probability of H0, κ0 ∈ (0, 1);
L1:
Decide on Experiment and the Decision Process ∆ = {δ(x, u;α)} to Use;
Specify LoS, α ∈ (0, 1);
Perform Experiment to Obtain Data (x, u);
Compute d = δ(x, u;α) or p = P (x, u);
Update Probability of H0 into κ0(x, u) by either using (x, u), d, or p according to updating formulas (9),
(10), or (12), respectively;
If ((k0(x, u) < ) or (k0(x, u) > 1− )) then
{Declare H0 is TRUE [FALSE] if κ0(x, u) > 1−  [κ0(x, u) < ]; STOP.}
Else {κ0 ← κ0(x, u); Back to L1;}
We will now establish Theorem 8.1. We do so by establishing some intermediate results. We will assume
the following set of conditions:
Set of Conditions
(i) Goal is to decide or gain knowledge about H0 : f = f0 and H1 : f = f1.
(ii) ν({x : f0(x) 6= f1(x)}) > 0.
(iii) For the mth study (m = 1, 2, . . .), Xm = (Xmj , j = 1, 2, . . . , nm), which are IID random variables from
f , are observed.
(iv) The observables X1, X2, . . . , Xm, . . . are independent of each other.
(v) The initial prior probabilities κ0 and κ1 = 1− κ0 are in (0, 1).
We denote by δ∗m(·, ·;αm) the size-αm MP decision function and by ρm(αm) its associated (power) ROC
function. The ROC function of the decision function based on only one observation will be denoted by ρ¯(·).
We also denote by
Λm(xm) =
nm∏
j=1
f1(xmj)
f0(xmj)
=
nm∏
j=1
Λ(xmj)
the likelihood ratio for the mth study, with Λ(x) = f1(x)/f0(x).
Lemma 8.1. α 7→ ρm(α) satisfies ρm(α) ≥ ρ¯(α) > α for every α ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. The second inequality has already been established in Proposition 4.1. The first inequality follows
from the fact that the size-α MP decision function based on only one observation belongs to the collection
of all size-α decision functions based on nm observations. As such the power of the MP decision function in
this collection is at least equal to all other decision functions in this collection, in particular, the MP decision
function based only on one observation.
Lemma 8.2. If E0[| log Λ(X)|] <∞, then as M →∞,
∑M
m=1 log Λm(Xm)→ −∞ almost surely under H0.
Proof. First note that
∑M
m=1 log Λm(Xm) =
∑M
m=1
∑nm
j=1 log Λ(Xmj). Under H0 we have, using Jensen’s
Inequality and since P0{f0(X) 6= f1(X)} > 0, that
E0[log Λ(X)] < logE0[Λ(X)] = log
∫ [
f1(x)
f0(x)
]
f0(x)ν(dx) = log(1) = 0. (16)
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Since {log Λ(Xmj), j = 1, . . . , nm;m = 1, 2, . . .} are IID random variables and by the condition that
E0[log Λ(X)] < ∞, then by Kolmogorov’s Strong Law of Large Numbers (see Theorem 7.5.1 in [25]) it
follows that, as M →∞,
1∑M
m=1 nm
M∑
m=1
nm∑
j=1
log Λ(Xmj)
converges almost surely, under H0, to E0[log Λ(X)], which from (16) is strictly negative. The result thence
follows since nm ≥ 1 for every m so that
∑M
m=1 nm →∞ as M →∞.
Below we let, for m = 1, 2, . . ., Dm = δ
∗
m(Xm, Um;αm) and
Vm = Dm log
[
ρm(αm)
αm
]
+ (1−Dm) log
[
1− ρm(αm)
1− αm
]
.
Lemma 8.3. Suppose there exists an  > 0 and an open interval I ⊂ [0, 1] such that
sup
α∈I
[
α log
(
ρ¯(α)
α
)
+ (1− α) log
(
1− ρ¯(α)
1− α
)]
≤ −,
and for the sequences of LOSs {αm,m = 1, 2, . . .} ⊂ I and sample sizes {nm,m = 1, 2, . . .}, we have
∞∑
m=1
αm(1− αm)
m2
[
log
(
ρm(αm)
αm
1− αm
1− ρm(αm)
)]2
<∞.
Then, under H0,
∑M
m=1 Vm → −∞, almost surely as M →∞.
Proof. It is easy to see that the mapping y 7→ g(y) = α log(y/α) + (1− α) log((1− y)/(1− α)) for α ∈ (0, 1)
and y ∈ (α, 1) is decreasing in y. Consequently, using this result, Lemma 8.1, and the first condition of the
Lemma,
µm ≡ E0(Vm) = αm log
(
ρm(αm)
αm
)
+ (1− αm) log
(
1− ρm(αm)
1− αm
)
≤ αm log
(
ρ¯(αm)
αm
)
+ (1− αm) log
(
1− ρ¯(αm)
1− αm
)
≡ µ¯(αm) ≤ sup
α∈I
µ¯(α) ≤ −.
By the second condition of the Lemma, we have
∑∞
m=1 V ar0 [Vm/m] <∞. Therefore, by Corollary 7.4.1 in
[25], we conclude that, under H0,
1
M
M∑
m=1
(Vm − µm)→ 0
almost surely. Thus, as M →∞, since ∑Mm=1 µm → −∞, then ∑Mm=1 Vm → −∞ almost surely.
We remark that the conditions in the lemma impose some constraints on the sample size and the LoS
sequences. These conditions will hold, for instance, if the sample sizes nms are bounded and αms are bounded
away from 0 and 1, which in practice are realistic conditions.
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Lemma 8.4. Let Pm be the P -functional for the mth study. If
∞∑
m=1
1
m2
∫ 1
0
[log ρ′m(u)]
2du <∞
and, for some  > 0, lim supm
∫ 1
0
log ρ′m(u)du ≤ − then, under H0, almost surely,
M∑
m=1
log ρ′m(Pm)→ −∞.
Proof. The first condition guarantees the finiteness of the mean and variance of log ρ′m(Pm), and by Jensen’s
Inequality we have
E0[log ρ
′
m(Pm)] < logE0ρ
′
m(Pm) = log
∫ 1
0
ρ′m(u)du = log(1) = 0.
The second condition guarantees that
∑M
m=1E0[log ρ
′
m(Pm)] → −∞ as M → ∞. Since the first condition
also implies that
∞∑
m=1
V ar0
[
log ρ′m(Pm)
m
]
<∞,
then, by Corollary 7.4.1 in [25], we have, as M →∞,
M∑
m=1
(log ρ′m(Pm)− E0[log ρ′m(Pm)])
M
→ 0
almost surely under H0. Thus, as M →∞, since
∑M
m=1E0[log ρ
′
m(Pm)]→ −∞, then
∑M
m=1 log ρ
′
m(Pm)→
−∞ almost surely under H0.
Theorem 8.1. Under the conditions stated, together with the conditions in the lemmas, the sequence of
posterior probabilities of H0, given either Xm, Dm, or Pm on the mth study, converges almost surely, under
H0, to one.
Proof. After the mth study, the posterior probability of H0 is given by
κ0m =
1 + κ1
κ0
× exp

m∑
j=1
I{Jj = 1} log Λj(Xj)+
m∑
j=1
I{Jj = 2}Vj +
m∑
j=1
I{Jj = 3} log ρ′j(Pj)

−1 ,
where Jm equals 1 if Xm is reported, 2 if Dm is reported, and 3 if Pm is reported in the mth study. Let
{Jm,m = 1, 2, . . .} be the specific sequence that is observed. Define subsequences {J (1)m ,m = 1, 2, . . .},
{J (2)m ,m = 1, 2, . . .}, and {J (3)m ,m = 1, 2, . . .} with J (j)m = min{k > J (j)m : Jm = j} for j = 1, 2, 3. At least one
of these subsequences will be an infinite subsequence (note that it is possible all three subsequences are infinite
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subsequences). By Lemmas 8.2, 8.3, and 8.4, outside of a P0-null set, {
∑m
j=1 log Λj(Xj),m = 1, 2, . . .},
{∑mj=1 Vj ,m = 1, 2, . . .}, and {∑mj=1 log ρ′j(Pj)} all diverges to −∞, hence any infinite subsequence from
each of these sequences will also diverge to −∞. Since at least one of {J (j)m ,m = 1, 2, . . .} is an infinite
subsequence, then outside of a P0-null set, {
∑m
j=1 I{Jj = 1} log Λj(Xj) +
∑m
j=1 I{Jj = 2}Vj +
∑m
j=1 I{Jj =
3} log ρ′j(Pj),m = 1, 2, . . .} diverges to −∞. Therefore, P0-almost surely, {κ0m,m = 1, 2, . . .} converges to 1
since κ0 ∈ (0, 1).
To demonstrate the phenomenon described in Theorem 8.1 empirically, we refer back to the fourth panels
of Figures 2 and 3. These panels depict the sequence of posterior probabilities for H0 updated from the
sequence of decisions dms and also the sequence of realized P -functionals pms. Observe that the plot of these
posterior probabilities with respect to m are wiggly for small m, but starts stabilizing and converging to 1
when H0 is true and to 0 when H0 is false. Through sequential updating, the issue of whether a specific
result is replicable or not becomes a moot point, since whatever that result, so long as it was obtained with
integrity and honesty, it will contribute to the updating of the knowledge about H0 and H1, in essence, it
becomes a data point for the search for truth.
9 Impact of Publication or Reporting Bias
Theorem 8.1 points to a coherent and sensible approach to sequentially acquiring knowledge about H0 and
H1 in the sense that if more and more studies are conducted, then the sequence of posterior probabilities of
H0 [H1] will converge to 1 under H0 [H1]. But, what could potentially derail this approach? The reality of
the publication process of manuscripts submitted for publication or just on the reporting of results of studies
is the existence of a bias against results that are ‘not-significant’. This means that if a study resulted in a
decision d = 0, then there is a smaller chance that this result will be published or reported compared to when
the decision is d = 1. Similarly, studies with large observed P -functionals have smaller chances of getting
reported or published. Such studies whose results do not get published or reported could therefore not be
used in the posterior probability updating of the knowledge about H0 and H1. What will be the impact of
this?
Recall that we denoted by
V = D log(ρ(α)/α) + (1−D) log((1− ρ(α))/(1− α))
with D = δ∗(X,U ;α) the log-likelihood ratio based on realization of the decision function. When there is
no bias in the publication or reporting process, then, under H0, D has a Bernoulli distribution with success
probability of α. We have used this result to show that, under H0, by using Jensen’s Inequality, we have
E0(V ) < 0. This is the reason why, under H0, the sequence of posterior probabilities converges almost surely
to 1.
But consider a simple model where a publication bias exists. Thus, upon observing D, which is governed
by the probability P0 (more precisely, P0 ⊗ λ), there is a second stochastic step which determines whether
the result of the study will be reported or not. This step will depend only on the observed value of D. Let
I = 1(0) if the result of the study is published or reported (not published nor reported). We suppose that
the conditional probability distribution of I, given D, is given by
Q(I = 1|D = 1) = η1 = 1−Q(I = 0|D = 1);
Q(I = 1|D = 0) = η0 = 1−Q(I = 0|D = 0),
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where 0 ≤ η0 < η1 ≤ 1. We denote by P ∗0 the probability measure that governs (D, I) under P0. Under this
model, we will only be able to observe D if I = 1. Thus, the observable D∗, which equals D when I = 1,
possesses the probability distribution, under H0, given by
P ∗0 (D
∗ = 1) = P ∗0 (D = 1|I = 1) =
αη1
αη1 + (1− α)η0 = 1− P
∗
0 (D
∗ = 0).
Observe that since η0 < η1, we have P
∗
0 (D
∗ = 1) > α, indicating that the desired size of α is not anymore
satisfied if D∗ is the variable that is observed instead of D. Denote by
V ∗ = D∗ log(ρ(α)/α) + (1−D∗) log((1− ρ(α))/(1− α))
the observable log-likelihood ratio, purportedly based on D. With E∗0 (·) denoting expectation with respect
to the probability measure P ∗0 , we have
E∗0 (V
∗) = E∗0{D∗ log(ρ(α)/α) + (1−D∗) log((1− ρ(α))/(1− α))}
=
(
αη1
αη1 + (1− α)η0
)
log
[
ρ(α)(1− α)
α(1− ρ(α))
]
+ log
[
1− ρ(α)
1− α
]
> α log
[
ρ(α)(1− α)
α(1− ρ(α))
]
+ log
[
1− ρ(α)
1− α
]
= E0(V ).
We already know that E0(V ) < 0, but because of the above inequality, we could not anymore guarantee that
E∗0 (V
∗) < 0, that is, it could be that E∗0 (V
∗) > 0. An extreme case of this situation is when η1 = 1 and
η0 = 0, where studies that do not lead to rejections of H0 are never getting published nor reported, while
those that lead to rejections of H0 are always getting published or reported. In this extreme case we will
have
E∗0 (V
∗) = log
[
ρ(α)(1− α)
α(1− ρ(α))
]
+ log
[
1− ρ(α)
1− α
]
= log
[
ρ(α)
α
]
> 0.
Note that this situation is not outside the realm of possibilities. Imagine, for instance, the situation where
a well-respected research team, headed by a prominent Nobel-prize winning scientist, have just published a
study which led to the rejection of H0. Subsequent studies by other research teams that did not lead to the
rejection of the same H0 may then never see the light of day – for how could they go against the established
research team? But, it is possible that the well-respected research team has committed an error of decision
in rejecting H0, since there are no certainties in decision-making based on data. Now, in such cases where
E∗0 (V
∗) > 0, there is the possibility that, even under H0, the sequence of posterior probabilities of H0, based
on a sequence of V ∗1 , V
∗
2 , . . ., may converge to 0, instead of 1.
Let us also examine the case with P -functionals. We have shown, using Jensen’s Inequality and the
uniformity of P under H0, that E0[log ρ
′(P )] < 0. In the presence of publication or reporting bias against
large P ’s, with I indicating once more if the result of a study is published or reported, suppose that
Q(I = 1|P = p) = g(p), p ∈ (0, 1),
with g(·) not identically equal to 1 almost everywhere and g(p) is non-increasing in p. Note that g(p) ≤ 1
hence
∫ 1
0
g(p)dp < 1. These conditions imply that smaller values of P lead to higher chances of getting
published or reported. Let us denote by P ∗ the published or reported P , and denote by P ∗0 the probability
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measure induced by P0 and Q that governs (P, I) under H0. Then, the probability density function of P
∗,
under H0, is given by
hP∗(p) =
(1)g(p)∫ 1
0
(1)g(w)dw
≡ g¯(p), p ∈ (0, 1).
Since g(·) is non-increasing, then, for every p ∈ (0, 1), ∫ p
0
g¯(w)dw ≥ ∫ p
0
(1)dw = p, with strict inequality for
some p. Thus, under H0, P
∗ is stochastically smaller than P . Since p 7→ log ρ′(p) is non-increasing, then it
follows that
E∗0 [log ρ
′(P ∗)] =
∫ 1
0
[log ρ′(p)]g¯(p)dp >
∫ 1
0
[log ρ′(p)](1)dp = E0[log ρ′(P )].
Note that this result also follows from the fact that if V1
st
< V2 and if a(·) is an integrable non-increasing
function, then E[a(V1)] > E[a(V2)]. Thus, even if E0[log ρ
′(P )] < 0, there is no more guarantee that
E∗0 [log ρ
′(P ∗)] < 0. In fact, consider an extreme case where we take g(p) = I{p ≤ c} where c ∈ (0, 1) is such
that ρ′(p) > (<)1 when p < (>)c. Then, in this case, we will have
E∗0 [log ρ
′(P ∗)] =
∫ 1
0
[log ρ′(p)]g¯(p)dp =
1
c
∫ c
0
[log ρ′(p)]dp > 0.
Thus, in the presence of publication or reporting bias, we could have that
E∗0 [log ρ
′(P ∗)] > 0,
so that it is possible that the sequence of posterior probabilities of H0 updated from a sequence of P
∗
1 , P
∗
2 , . . .
may converge to 0, instead of 1, even under H0.
10 Considerations on the Choice of LoS
If possible, it would be preferable to adhere to the principle that a mathematical theory of statistical decision-
making or of updating knowledge about H0 and H1 should not rely on arbitrary constants which cannot
be justified within the theory — for if it does the theory becomes mathematically ‘impure’. The rationale
behind the conventional choice of α = 0.05, or some other small value such as 0.01 or 0.10, for the LoS
in existing statistical decision-making procedures is in order to put an upper bound to the probability of
committing a Type I error, which occurs when H0 is rejected when it is in fact true, considered to be a
more serious type of error than a Type II error, which is accepting H0 when in fact it is false. However,
this arbitrary choice of α = 0.05 is difficult to justify within the theory and it could be viewed as a stain in
existing statistical decision-making methods and perhaps could be their Waterloo. This choice has been the
source of controversies and criticisms of existing hypothesis testing methods. Criticizing the use of such a
threshold, Professor John Ioannidis [13] wrote:
... the high rate of nonreplication (lack of confirmation) of research discoveries is a consequence
of the convenient, yet ill-founded strategy of claiming conclusive research findings solely on the
basis of a single study assessed by formal statistical significance, typically for a p-value less than
0.05.
The attacks on P -values and the LoS threshold of α = .05 has in fact continued unabated. Recently,
there was the editorial article by Wasserstein, Schirm and Lazar [32] with the provocative title: Moving
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to a World Beyond “p < 0.05”. See also the many articles in The American Statistician issue in which
[32] appeared, which deal with P -value controversies, criticisms, and proposed changes. The paper [29] also
discusses reasons why the NHST approach is an unsuitable tool in scientific research. But, see also the
papers of [3, 5] that provide comparisons, contrasts, and reconciliations of the NHST, Neyman-Pearson, and
Bayesian approaches to statistical decision-making.
So, how should one choose an LoS value to use? As pointed out earlier, any decision-maker could choose
any LoS he desires since whatever his choice is will be properly taken into account in the log-likelihood ratio
based on d. So, the appropriate question is whether there is a way to choose an LoS value to optimize the
information that the decision-maker could acquire from his study. We will argue below that it should depend
on the major goal of the decision-maker and the viewpoint of his decision-making process.
10.1 Game-Theoretic Approach
If the decision-maker desires to make an immediate decision between H0 and H1 based on his study, then
he should consider the cost consequences of his possible decisions. Thus, suppose that Cij is the cost
incurred by deciding for Hj when Hi is the truth, with C01 > C00 and C10 > C11. The specification of the
cost consequences of decisions should reflect the relative severities of the possible decisions under the two
possible states of reality. For the decision function δ∗(α), the expected costs or risks under H0 and H1 are,
respectively,
R0(α) = E0[Cost(α)] = C00(1− α) + C01α;
R1(α) = E1[Cost(α)] = C10(1− ρ(α)) + C11ρ(α).
If the decision-maker supposes that he is making his decision against an adversary who controls the choice of
which of H0 or H1 will be the truth and whose intent is to maximize his cost, or if he simply wants to be as
conservative as possible, then he should utilize an LoS α which will minimize his maximum risk, a minimax
approach. The appropriate αM is then given by
αM = arg minα∈[0,1] max{R0(α), R1(α)}. (17)
If the curves α 7→ R0(α) and α 7→ R1(α) intersect over α ∈ [0, 1], then the value of αM is the α satisfying
R0(α) = R1(α). There will be a point of intersection if C10 ≥ C00 and C01 ≥ C11 (for instance, when
C00 = C11 = 0), and αM satisfies the equation
ρ(αM ) +
[
C01 − C00
C10 − C11
]
αM −
[
C10 − C00
C10 − C11
]
= 0. (18)
On the other hand, if C11 ≥ C01, then αM = 1; while if C00 ≥ C10, then αM = 0.
10.2 Bayes Approach
An alternative for the decision-maker is to define a weighted expected cost or risk, where the risks under
H0 and H1 are weighted by the respective prior probabilities of H0 and H1, resulting in the Bayes risk for
δ∗(α), given by
BayesRisk(α) = κ0R0(α) + (1− κ0)R1(α).
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The decision-maker could then choose the α minimizing BayesRisk(α), denoted by αB . Here, κ0 represents
the decision-maker’s prior probability that H0 is true. The solution is the αB that satisfies
ρ′(αB) =
κ0
1− κ0
C01 − C00
C10 − C11 . (19)
This choice of LoS, denoted by αB , leads to the decision function δ
∗(αB) which coincides with the Bayes
decision function, which is the one minimizing the Bayes risk among all decision functions (see, for instance,
[26]). An indirect argument for this result is that Bayes decision functions are also of the form of the MP
decision functions, hence since we minimized the Bayes risk among the MP decision functions, the αB in
(19) therefore finds the Bayes decision function.
10.3 Optimizing Knowledge Accrual
Another alternative for the decision-maker is to focus instead on optimizing the change that will accrue
about his knowledge of H0 or H1 based on the result of his decision function. It is then sensible to choose an
LoS α such that the expected log-likelihood ratios, based on D, under H0 and H1, achieve their maximum
difference. The expected log-likelihood ratio based on D, under H0 and H1, are respectively,
E0[log ΛD] = α log
[
ρ(α)
α
]
+ (1− α) log
[
1− ρ(α)
1− α
]
;
E1[log ΛD] = ρ(α) log
[
ρ(α)
α
]
+ (1− ρ(α)) log
[
1− ρ(α)
1− α
]
.
The difference between these two expected log-likelihood ratios is
D(α) = E1[log ΛD]− E0[log ΛD] = [ρ(α)− α] log
[
ρ(α)
α
1− α
1− ρ(α)
]
.
The decision-maker could then choose the α that maximizes D(α), that is,
αD = arg maxα∈[0,1]D(α). (20)
Note that in this approach for choosing the LoS, no consideration is given to the cost consequences of the
decision since the main focus is to optimize the gain in accrued knowledge about H0 and H1 from the result
of the decision function.
10.4 Sample Size Determination
An important issue that arises is that of determining the proper sample size n to use in a given study. The
ROC function ρ(·) depends on such a sample size, so that we may write ρ(α;n) and ρ′(α;n). In each of the
approaches for determining the LoS to utilize, the optimal α will then also depend on n, so we may write
this as α∗(n). We could then determine the appropriate sample size n∗ by specifying a lower bound b > 0
for the logarithm of the odds-ratio and letting
n∗ = n∗(b) = min
{
n ≥ 1 : log
[
ρ(α∗(n);n)
α∗(n)
1− α∗(n)
1− ρ(α∗(n);n)
]
≥ b
}
= min
{
n ≥ 1 :
(
ρ(α∗(n);n)
1− ρ(α∗(n);n)
)
≥
(
α∗(n)
1− α∗(n)
)
eb
}
. (21)
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This sample size determination approach is in contrast to existing procedures where an LoS value is specified,
usually to be α = .05, and a lower threshold for the power is also specified, say 0.95, and then the desired
sample size is determined.
10.5 Concrete Example
We demonstrate the ideas in this section by using a simple normal model. Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be IID
N(µ, σ2) with σ2 known, and consider the problem of deciding between H0 : µ = µ0 versus H1 : µ = µ1 with
µ1 > µ0. Since the sample mean X¯ is sufficient for µ, we reduce the problem to just having X¯ ∼ N(µ, σ2/n).
The MP decision function of size α is
δ(X¯;α) = I{X¯ > µ0 + Φ−1(1− α)(σ/
√
n)}
whose associated ROC function is, with ξ = (µ1 − µ0)/σ being the standardized effect size,
ρ(α) = 1− Φ [Φ−1(1− α)− ξ√n] . (22)
Its derivative is
ρ′(α) =
φ
[
Φ−1(1− α)− ξ√n]
φ [Φ−1(1− α)] = exp
{
ξ
√
n[Φ−1(1− α)− ξ√n/2]} . (23)
We now determine αM , αB , and αD according to the prescriptions in subsections 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3,
respectively.
To determine αM we need to solve the equation
ρ(α) +R1α−R0 = 0
with R1 = (C01 − C00)/(C10 − C11) and R0 = (C10 − C00)/(C10 − C11). Letting w = Φ−1(1 − α), so that
α = 1− Φ(w), the resulting equation to be solved with respect to w is
Φ(w − ξ√n) +R1Φ(w)−R2 = 0
with R2 = R1 + 1 − R0 = (C01 − C11)/(C10 − C11). This equation could be solved numerically, e.g., via
Newton-Raphson algorithm, to obtain wM , from which we then obtain αM = 1 − Φ(wM ). In the special
case where R1 = 1 and R2 = 1, which arises when C01 = C10 > 0 and C00 = C11 = 0, we directly obtain
wM = ξ
√
n/2 leading to
αM = Φ
[−ξ√n
2
]
and ρ(αM ) = Φ
[
ξ
√
n
2
]
.
To determine αB , we need to solve the equation
ρ′(α) = R3 ≡ κ0
1− κ0
C01 − C00
C10 − C11 .
Using the expression in (23), and solving directly for αB , we find that
αB = Φ
[
−ξ
√
n
2
− 1
ξ
√
n
log(R3)
]
and ρ(αB) = Φ
[
ξ
√
n
2
− 1
ξ
√
n
log(R3)
]
.
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In the special case when R3 = 1, such as when κ0 = 1/2, the least favorable prior, and with C01 = C10 > 0
and C00 = C11 = 0, we obtain
αB = Φ
[
−ξ
√
n
2
]
and ρ(αB) = Φ
[
ξ
√
n
2
]
,
thus coinciding with the special case for αM .
For αD, we need to find the maximizer of the mapping α 7→ H(α) with
H(α) = [ρ(α)− α] log
[
ρ(α)
α
1− α
1− ρ(α)
]
.
Observe that H(α) > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1); limα↓0H(α) = 0, and limα↑1H(α) = 0 by Proposition 4.1. Differenti-
ating H(α), we obtain
H ′(α) = [ρ′(α)− 1] log log
[
ρ(α)
α
1− α
1− ρ(α)
]
+ [ρ(α)− α]
[
ρ′(α)
ρ(α)(1− ρ(α)) −
1
α(1− α)
]
.
From the special case when solving for αB , we have ρ
′(α)− 1 = 0 satisfied by α∗ = Φ(−ξ√n/2), and for this
α∗ we have ρ(α∗) = 1 − α∗ and α∗ = 1 − ρ(α∗), so that H ′(α∗) = 0. Furthermore, since H ′(α) goes from
positive values to negative values as α goes from 0 to 1, then in fact α∗ = Φ(−ξ√n/2) is the maximizer of
α 7→ H(α). Therefore, we have shown that
αD = α
∗ = Φ
[−ξ√n
2
]
and ρ(αD) = Φ
[
ξ
√
n
2
]
.
This solution coincides with the solutions for αM and αB under the special cases arising from κ0 = 1/2, C01 =
C10 > 0, and C00 = C11 = 0. Note that the αD does not depend on κ0 and the Cij ’s since its derivation
does not take into account the decision-maker’s cost consequences of his decision and his prior knowledge
about H0.
To be able to concretely compare the values of αM , αB , and αD, we obtain them under this normal
one-sample setting and for different combinations of values of C01, C10, κ0, n, and ξ = (µ1 − µ0)/σ, the
effect size. We set C00 = C11 = 0. The computation of αM utilized the Newton-Raphson algorithm. Table
1 summarizes the values obtained under the different scenarios. From this table, observe that as the effect
size increases, the LoS values from each of the three approaches decrease. Furthermore, note that when
ξ = .5 and under the case where C01 = C10 = 1, κ0 = .5, the LoS values are much larger than α = .05.
The reason for this is that with these higher LoS values, more information accrues based on the outcome
d of the decision function compared to when α = .05. In addition, notice the drastic change in αM and
αB when the cost consequences are not equal compared to when they were equal. In essence, the choice of
LoS should depend on the other elements of the decision problem, hence a fixed threshold of α = .05, for
whatever decision problem at hand, is just untenable and unjustifiable.
Depending on which rationale the decision-maker uses for his determination of his LoS α∗, he could then
determine an appropriate sample size for his experiment or study according to the formula (21) in subsection
10.4. We demonstrate this for the case of αD, which also happens to be the same solutions for αM and αB in
special case where C01 = C10 = 1 and κ0 = .5. Given a lower bound b > 0, from (21), we seek the smallest
integer n satisfying [
Φ(ξ
√
n/2)
1− Φ(ξ√n/2)
]
≥
[
1− Φ(ξ√n/2)
Φ(ξ
√
n/2)
]
eb.
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Table 1: LoS values αM , αB , and αD associated with the different approaches for determining an optimal
LoS for the one-sample normal model under different combinations of costs C01, C10, H0 prior probability
κ0, sample size n, and effect size ξ = (µ1 − µ0)/σ.
Setting # C01 C10 κ0 n ξ αM αB αD
1 1 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.401294 0.401294 0.401294
2 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.308538 0.308538 0.308538
3 1 1 0.5 1 2 0.158655 0.158655 0.158655
4 1 1 0.5 5 0.5 0.288075 0.288075 0.288075
5 1 1 0.5 5 1 0.131776 0.131776 0.131776
6 1 1 0.5 5 2 0.012674 0.012674 0.012674
7 1 1 0.25 1 0.5 0.401294 0.974246 0.401294
8 1 1 0.25 1 1 0.308538 0.725284 0.308538
9 1 1 0.25 1 2 0.158655 0.326105 0.158655
10 1 1 0.25 5 0.5 0.288075 0.664075 0.288075
11 1 1 0.25 5 1 0.131776 0.265422 0.131776
12 1 1 0.25 5 2 0.012674 0.023273 0.012674
13 10 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.081468 1e-06 0.401294
14 10 1 0.5 1 1 0.068649 0.002535 0.308538
15 10 1 0.5 1 2 0.040108 0.015727 0.158655
16 10 1 0.5 5 0.5 0.065308 0.004416 0.288075
17 10 1 0.5 5 1 0.034035 0.015866 0.131776
18 10 1 0.5 5 2 0.003666 0.002971 0.012674
19 10 1 0.25 1 0.5 0.081468 0.003931 0.401294
20 10 1 0.25 1 1 0.068649 0.044193 0.308538
21 10 1 0.25 1 2 0.040108 0.054579 0.158655
22 10 1 0.25 5 0.5 0.065308 0.050932 0.288075
23 10 1 0.25 5 1 0.034035 0.048814 0.131776
24 10 1 0.25 5 2 0.003666 0.006118 0.012674
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Directly solving this inequality, the desired sample size n∗ = n∗(b) is the smallest integer at least equal to
n¯ = n¯(b) =
4
[
Φ−1
(
exp(b/2)
1+exp(b/2)
)]2
σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 .
For this sample size, determined by specifying the lower bound b, we find that
αD(b) =
1
1 + exp(b/2)
and ρ(αD(b)) =
exp(b/2)
1 + exp(b/2)
.
When b = 6, this becomes
n¯(b = 6) =
4(1.6703)2σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 .
For this b = 6 and n¯(b = 6), we obtain αD(b = 6) = 0.0474 and ρ(αD(b = 6)) = 0.9526. Recall that in the
usual sample size calculation where we specify the LoS to be α = .05 and with the power to be 1− β = .95,
the required sample size is the smallest integer at least equal to
n˜ =
[Φ−1(1− β) + Φ−1(1− α)]2σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 =
4(1.645)2σ2
(µ1 − µ0)2 .
Interestingly, if one wants the b that will lead to an LoS of exactly α = .05, we find that you should take
b = 2 log(95/5) = 5.8889¯, which is a rather mysterious number (at least compared to the perfect number1
b = 6), lending further mystery to the common, typical, conventional, and age-old choice of an LoS of
α = 0.05!
11 Summary and Concluding Remarks
Humankind’s desire to acquire knowledge in the pursuit of the truth of whatever phenomenon is at hand, be
it about “eternal and long-lasting truths” according to Efron, or of matters more ephemeral and temporally
of passing interest, such as President Trump’s income taxes, is deeply ingrained in our DNA. The search
for truth has especially both fascinated and confounded us all in the past few years, what with Trump’s
adviser Rudy Giuliani exclaiming on national television about “Truth isn’t Truth” or with the proliferation
of fake news for nefarious purposes which are unwittingly being facilitated by technological platforms in the
social media arena. In fact, even in books and fictional novels, the search for truth is of paramount interest.
Indeed, from the best-selling fictional novel titled The Art of Racing in the Rain by Garth Stein [28], which
has been adapted for film by Walt Disney Studios Motion Pictures and released this year, we encounter a
dialogue involving the main canine character, Enzo:
“Inside each of us resides the truth,” I began, “the absolute truth. But sometimes the truth is
hidden in a hall of mirrors. Sometimes we believe we are viewing the real thing, when in fact we
are viewing a facsimile, a distortion. As I listen to this trial, I am reminded of the climactic scene
of a James Bond film, The Man with the Golden Gun. James Bond escaped his hall of mirrors by
breaking the glass, shattering the illusions, until only the true villain stood before him. We, too,
1A perfect number is such that it is equal to the sum of its proper divisors. The number 6 is the smallest perfect number
since it is the sum of its proper divisors 1, 2, and 3.
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must shatter the mirrors. We must look into ourselves and root out the distortions until that
thing which we know in our hearts is perfect and true, stands before us. Only then will justice
be served.”
The development of appropriate methods useful in the search for truth and the acquisition of knowledge
using data is one of the foremost, if not the main, goal of statisticians. We, statisticians and data scientists,
must continue re-examining existing methods and refine them if there are problems, so that we may facilitate
the ‘breaking of the glass and the shattering of the illusions’. Controversies have arisen in the use of existing
statistical procedures for decision-making, especially those that utilize P -values and the setting of hard
thresholds, such as α = .05, for the level of significance. Thus, there is a need to re-examine these existing
procedures to determine if they could be improved or altogether replaced by newer methods. This paper
is in this spirit. It re-examined existing statistical decision-making approaches in the most fundamental of
settings, that of deciding between, or sequentially acquiring knowledge about, two simple hypotheses. It is
expected that the clarity provided by dealing with this fundamental setting will result in improving methods
for more complicated settings, in a similar vein that the Neyman-Pearson Fundamental Lemma [20] enabled
the solutions of hypothesis testing problems in complicated settings.
The Neyman-Pearson MP decision function for deciding between two simple hypotheses is still the linchpin
of the theory of statistical decision-making. The classical approach is to specify the LoS α, which is the
maximum allowable probability of a Type I error. One then looks for that decision function that maximizes
the power under H1, the MP decision function. It turns out, however, that the more beneficial approach is to
consider the stochastic process of MP decision functions indexed by α and to look at the receiver operating
characteristic function of the decision process, which is the power of the MP decision function as a function
of α. We then clarified the notion of the P -functional, usually called the P -value statistic, as a functional of
the decision process. The notion of replicability was then examined in the context of observing the outcomes
of a decision function and the P -functional. We concur with the NAS report [19] that replicability should
be viewed in ‘the context of an entire body of evidence, rather than an individual study or an individual
replication.’ This led to the question on how the results of studies should be reported. We argued that when
reporting the outcome of the decision function, that it is imperative to accompany it with the value of either
the likelihood ratio or the logarithm of the likelihood ratio based on observing the decision function. This
value will provide a measure of the strength of support, either for H0 or H1, given the decision. Whatever
LoS value is used will be automatically incorporated into this summary measure, so that a decision-maker
is actually free to choose whatever LoS value he desires, so long as it is not decided after seeing the data.
If one wants to report the value p of the P -functional, this should simply be used to make the decision,
which is to reject H0 if and only if p is no more than the specified LoS α, which in fact corresponds to the
decision made using the level α MP decision function. The value itself of p could be misleading in terms of
the information it provides about whether the results of the study supports H0 or H1. For instance, it is
possible that p = 0.0001, but this could still be more supportive of H0 than of H1. Rather, what should be
reported is the value of the P -functional density under H1, given by ρ
′(p), or equivalently log ρ′(p), which
is actually the likelihood ratio or the log-likelihood ratio, respectively, based on observing the P -functional.
This quantity is more informative compared to just the value of p. Furthermore, log-likelihood ratio profile
curves or contour plots could also be provided, especially when dealing with composite alternative hypothesis.
Discussion was then presented on updating knowledge of H0 and H1 when given the realization x of
the random observable X, the value d of a decision function δ∗(α), or the value p of the P -functional, via
Bayes theorem. It is demonstrated that a coherent way of acquiring knowledge about H0 and H1 is through
this process of sequential learning, where the current states of knowledge of H0 and H1 are updated, using
Bayes theorem, when results from new studies are reported. It is established that if there is no publication or
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reporting bias, then the sequence of posterior probabilities will converge to 1 (0) if H0 is true (false). Through
sequential learning, any study performed with integrity and honesty, whatever its results, will contribute to
the acquisition of knowledge about H0 and H1. This is the ideal situation of a community of researchers,
both cooperatively and competitively, seeking the truth about a certain phenomenon. However, it was also
demonstrated that in the presence of publication or reporting bias, a monkey-wrench is thrown into the
knowledge updating that, even under H0, it is possible to have the sequence of posterior probabilities of H0
to converge to 0, instead of 1.
It was argued that a decision-maker is free to choose any LoS value that he desires since it will automat-
ically be accounted for by the likelihood ratio based on the realized decision which should accompany the
decision. In essence, decision-makers should not consider an LoS value of α = .05 as having been ‘carved on
stone tablets.’ In fact, insisting on α = .05 which is a value not justifiable within the theory of statistical
decision-making, renders the mathematical theory ‘impure’, and this has led to controversies and criticisms.
The question therefore arose on how a decision-maker could optimally choose his LoS. Three approaches
were discussed for determining such an optimal LoS, each depending on the viewpoint that the decision-
maker is operating on. These approaches led to LoS values which are justifiable within the theory, thereby
making the theory ‘beautiful’ and free of arbitrary inputs. With these approaches to deciding on the LoS, a
new procedure for sample size determination was also developed. The ideas in this paper were demonstrated
using concrete examples pertaining to a two-sample problem, a one-sample problem, and the famous Fisher’s
lady tea-tasting experiment. It is hoped that the ideas presented and the proposed changes could improve
existing statistical decision-making methods and hopefully eliminate, or at least lessen, the criticisms being
hurled against these existing statistical decision-making methods.
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